Paul Spedero, the author of the major fire report, told reporters that while the Navy's "sailors are very well trained and knowledgeable in shipboard firefighting," that training "is largely focused on the underway environment when they have a full complement on board, all expertise, all critical leadership, as well as all equipment available." The report went on to urge leaders in groups that oversee fire safety for ships undergoing maintenance to "uphold" the changes that came in the wake of the Miami instead of letting "cost and schedule" take precedence. "The considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence," Conn wrote. Scott Conn, notes that the issues and compliance failures with that manual that were found aboard the Bonhomme Richard were also present on prior fires aboard three other ships: the Gunston Hall, the Oscar Austin and the Iwo Jima. However, the command investigation, written by Vice Adm. lost over time." It also found a Damage Control Board of Directors that was "ineffective," and an "overwhelming majority of piers and berths at Navy installations used for maintenance" that failed to meet the requirements put in place after the 2012 shipyard fire aboard the USS Miami.īoth new reports noted that the Miami fire, a case of arson at the hands of a shipyard worker, led to new standards commonly referred to as the "8010 manual" and the creation of the Damage Control Board of Directors.
The major fire review found that the lessons from past fires had "not effectively collected and. In the wake of the dayslong fire aboard the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard, the service launched two investigations - the usual command investigation that follows any serious mishap, as well as a historic "major fires review" that looked at the last 15 major fires aboard Navy ships going back 12 years. Read Next: Pentagon Abandons Its Support for Merging the Commissary and Exchange Systems "It's a core skill that we are going to, again, assess, understand, teach and scale to be assertive up-echelon in saying, 'This is what I see, and this is the risk I am accepting and or need up-echelon help to resolve.'" " first have to have a strong understanding of the risk they're accepting," he explained.
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